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Brian C. Barnett 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Conceptual Analysis 
Knowledge is the central concept of traditional epistemology. But what is knowledge? This is the most 
basic question about the central concept, hence the appropriate starting place. Answers traditionally 
come in the form of conceptual analysis: a set of more basic concepts out of which the analyzed 
concept is built, arranged to form a definition. The concept square, for example, is analyzable into 
components such as four-sided figure, right-angled, and equilateral.1 Our focus here is the analysis of 
knowledge. But we’ll also consider critiques of this focus, which yield useful insights and motivate new 
directions. The chapter closes with reflection on the value of epistemological conceptual analysis.  
 
Kinds of Knowledge 
Before undertaking analysis, our target concept needs refinement. “Knowledge” is an umbrella term, 
capturing a family of related meanings:  
1. Ability knowledge: knowledge-how (e.g., I know how to ride a bike.)  
2. Phenomenal knowledge: knowing “what it’s like” to have a given experience (e.g., She knows 
what strawberries taste like.)  
3. Acquaintance knowledge: knowing a person, place, or thing (e.g., Plato knew Socrates. He also 
knew Athens well.) 
4. Propositional knowledge: knowledge-that (e.g., Everybody reading this chapter knows that it is 
about knowledge.) 
What the first three have in common is that they require direct experience with their objects. I know 
how to ride a bike because I’ve had practice. I don’t know how to fly a plane, since I lack training—
despite having memorized the manual. She knows what strawberries taste like having tasted them, but 
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Upon completion of this chapter, readers will be able to: 
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not what it’s like to be a bat given her lack of batty experiences (to use Nagel’s famous 1974 example). 
Plato knew Socrates and Athens because he studied under him there; Plato knew neither Homer nor 
London because he neither met the man nor visited the place. Plato knew of Homer, and propositions 
about him, but nothing concerning London.2  
Whereas experiential knowledge receives emphasis in Eastern and some recent Western philosophy 
(see Poole on feminist epistemologies in Chapter 8), traditional Western epistemology emphasizes 
propositional knowledge.3 Such knowledge can be expressed with a that-clause, which expresses a 
proposition: a statement or claim—something with a truth value (true or false).4 The proposition that 
this chapter is about knowledge is true; the proposition that it’s about waterfall photography is false.5  
Propositional knowledge can be interpersonally communicated or acquired by evidence or argument. By 
contrast, experiential knowledge can be neither argued for nor linguistically transferred. Try as I might 
to describe the taste of strawberries to someone who hasn’t had the pleasure, it won’t suffice for 
knowing what it’s like. One will still learn something new upon first bite.  
Despite the importance of experiential knowledge, we’ll explore the traditional approach here. For 
brevity’s sake, then, let “knowledge” refer to the propositional variety. 
 
The Traditional Analysis 
The most influential analysis of propositional knowledge derives from Plato (c. 429–347 BCE). In his 
Meno dialogue, Plato’s character Socrates (modeled after his real-life teacher) argues that “knowledge 
differs from correct opinion in being tied down” by “an account of the reason why” (98a). This translates 
into modern parlance as given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 – Platonic to Modern Translation 
 
Platonic Term 
 
Modern Term 
 
Abbreviation 
 
Opinion Belief B 
Correct True T 
Account of the 
reason why 
Justification J 
Knowledge Knowledge K 
 
This translation yields the Traditional Analysis (or JTB Analysis): Knowledge is justified true belief. On 
this account, there are three concepts that pairwise overlap, and knowledge is the convergence of all 
three (see Figure 1). Let’s consider each in turn.  
Figure 1 – The Traditional Analysis 
 A. Belief 
Belief (in this context6) means accepting the proposition as true (equivalently: assenting to the 
proposition, thinking that it’s true, agreeing with it, or holding it as an opinion/view). Belief can range 
from a slight leaning to moderate assurance to absolute certainty—the entire positive half of the 
confidence spectrum (see Lopez on degrees of belief in Chapter 6).7 Belief excludes both the negative 
half of the spectrum (disbelief, or belief that the proposition is false) and the neutral, halfway point 
(withholding/suspending judgment). Belief, disbelief, and suspension are the main doxastic attitudes 
(stances on the truth value of a proposition). 
  
Figure 2 – The Doxastic Spectrum 
 
 
On the traditional analysis, knowing a proposition requires believing it. If a truth you’ve never thought of 
is “out there” awaiting discovery, you don’t know that truth. If you are now thinking about it but form 
no opinion (suspension), you still do not know. This is why, when asked about the truth value in cases of 
suspension, the natural answer is “I don’t know.” And if you have settled your opinion against the 
proposition (disbelief), you again do not know it. Suppose I ask, “Do you know that Marie Curie led the 
underground railroad?” You won’t say “Yes, I do know that.” Instead, you’ll deny it, perhaps offer a 
correction. What you know are related propositions you believe: that Curie did not do so but Harriet 
Tubman did.      
A word of caution: people often speak loosely. Loose talk is language that is inaccurate by strict literal 
standards—e.g., metaphor, hyperbole, approximation, and ellipsis (word omission). This phenomenon 
sometimes causes mistaken evaluations of conceptual analyses, since the aim of analysis is the strict 
literal truth. Consider the expression “I don’t believe it; I know it.” A natural interpretation is that one 
doesn’t merely believe it, where “merely” is omitted to achieve brevity. We use such elliptical speech 
routinely. Consider: “She’s not good at math; she’s great!” But if she’s not even good, she’s not great, 
since greatness is a degree of goodness. Let’s rephrase: “She’s not just good at math; she’s great.” This 
illuminates what was previously disguised—that the “not” negates a lesser degree rather than goodness 
altogether.8    
B. Truth 
Belief is one thing; truth is another. There are unbelieved truths (the Earth was spherical long before it 
occurred to anyone) and believed falsehoods (Ptolemy’s view that the Sun orbits the Earth). The 
problematic phrase “true for me” causes confusion on this issue. Ptolemy’s view may have been “true 
for him,” but this merely means he accepted it, not that it’s actually true. 
Acceptance and truth can come apart because human opinion is not a perfect measure of reality. We 
are capable of mistake. Acknowledging this is not a weakness but an expression of intellectual virtues, 
such as intellectual honesty and humility. This motivates inquiry, open-mindedness, collaboration, and 
change-of-opinion. Just as we sometimes recognize our own mistakes, we sometimes recognize others 
are mistaken. The situation may require speaking up about this (in an appropriate fashion); other times 
we should keep it to ourselves. Either way, prospective falsehood is why it’s a bad idea to believe just 
anything anyone says. We often need to reflect for ourselves and formulate beliefs independently. 
Between intellectual deference and autonomy lies virtuous inquiry. (For more on social dimensions, see 
Rowley on social epistemology, Chapter 7.)  
But what is truth? In Aristotle’s famous words,  
“To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, 
and of what is not that it is not, is true.” (1011b) 
This is an ancient precursor to a popular modern starting point—the Correspondence Theory: a 
proposition is true if it corresponds to reality, and false otherwise. While there are alternative theories, 
it is possible to interpret them as different takes on “correspondence.” Details won’t matter here.9  
Only true beliefs can qualify as knowledge on the traditional analysis. Suppose you claim to know the 
answer to a trivia question. The answer is revealed and you got it wrong. Your friend exclaims, “See, you 
didn’t know it!” This reaction is perfectly natural because false belief isn’t knowledge. This explains why 
teachers grade multiple choice questions based on whether students choose a correct answer: the 
purpose is to test knowledge, and whether students answer correctly is such a test. 
Again, loose talk skews intuition. Several books and a Weird Al Yankovic album are titled Everything You 
Know Is Wrong. However, at best, everything you think you know is wrong. If you think you know 
something, and it turns out to be false, then you’re mistaken to think you know it. Knowledge is factive 
(entails truth), whereas belief is non-factive (possibly wrong).10   
C. Justification 
We’ve seen that knowledge requires true belief. But even true beliefs can be unjustified. A justification 
is a good reason for belief (see Long, Chapter 2, for theoretical accounts). On the traditional analysis, 
justification is necessary for knowledge. To understand why, suppose you are playing trivia again 
(apparently, you’re hooked):  
“What is the name of those tiny bumps on blackberries?”  
Your guess: Choice D – Druplets.  
Desperate to win, you rationalize: “Yeah, this has to be right.”  
The answer is revealed, prompting your proud reaction: “See, I knew it!” 
Your friend remarks, “No, you didn’t. You were just guessing!”  
 
Your friend’s response is natural. Absent good reason, one does not know.  
Plato offered an explanation. He observed that knowledge is something stable (unlike mere opinion). It 
requires an anchor to the truth. Plato likened true opinion to the statues of Daedalus, which were so 
realistic they could fly away. You never knew where to find them. Justification is akin to tethering them 
down, facilitating reliable location. This makes evident why justification plays a role in the value of 
knowledge (see Axtell, Chapter 5, on epistemic value).  
Here, too, loose talk misleads: “The thermometer ‘knows’ the temperature”—but surely lacks 
justification. The justification condition is also dubious if inflated, as in Plato’s description. Knowledge 
doesn’t require “an account of the reason why” so much as a “reason-that.” One can know that a 
computer works but be clueless why. A reason-that need not be sophisticated. No argument or scientific 
demonstration is necessary. Just turn on the computer and see it working, recall this from memory, or 
be told by the technician testing it. Nor do good reasons have to be perfect. The concept good is weaker 
than perfect (maximally good). If perfect reasons were required, justification would be impossible (mere 
mortals are always subject to error).11 Tolerating imperfect reasons fits everyday judgments. In grade 
school, I had reason to believe Newtonian physics (testimony from trustworthy teachers and textbooks 
without reason to suspect oversimplification). My belief was justified—a belief I now recognize is false 
given quantum mechanics and Einsteinian relativity. Justified beliefs can be false—a view called 
fallibilism. For this reason, a separate truth condition on knowledge is not redundant.  
Another challenge to the justification condition is infant/animal knowledge. Is this mere loose talk? It’s 
unclear. Do they have a kind of weak justification? Difficult to say. Perhaps they know without 
justification. If so, we can distinguish two kinds of knowledge. Infants and animals have lightweight 
knowledge (true belief) but lack heavyweight knowledge—the kind we seek beyond mere correct 
opinion, where guessing and poor reasoning are precluded (Hawthorne 2002). The traditional analysis is 
meant to capture this heavyweight variety.  
Table 2 – Justification: The Fine Print 
To equate the justification 
condition with having good 
reasons is a simplification. 
According to standard fine 
print, the belief must be: 
 
Explanation 
 
Examples 
Properly based on …  It is possible to have a justification but 
fail to use it. One might instead base 
one’s belief on something unjustified. 
Knowledge requires believing because of 
good reasons. 
I know a mathematical proof of the 
Pythagorean Theorem. But suppose 
I don’t care about that. I like the 
word “Pythagorean” and have an 
odd habit of believing anything 
appealingly expressed. My belief 
would not be not properly based.  
good epistemic reasons … Some reasons are pragmatic (provide a 
practical benefit). Knowledge requires 
epistemic reasons (ones that are truth-
directed). 
I believe my favorite sports team 
will win because the thought makes 
me happy. This is a pragmatic 
reason, not epistemic. It won’t help 
me know who will win. If I discover 
the game has been rigged in my 
team’s favor, I won’t be happy. This 
reason is not pragmatic, but it is 
epistemic: it could give me 
knowledge of who will win.  
of sufficient strength … Good epistemic reasons can be weak 
(e.g., making the proposition more 
slightly probable than not). Knowledge 
may require sufficiently strong 
justification (though how this degree is 
determined is up for debate). 
There is a 51% chance that the next 
marble randomly drawn from the 
urn will be blue. I have a weak 
epistemic reason but do not know 
that it will be blue. 
that are undefeated. Even strong epistemic reasons can be 
outweighed or undermined by 
competing reasons (defeaters). If so, 
one’s justification is defeated. Only 
undefeated justification can supply 
knowledge. 
I see the flower before me. It 
appears rose-colored. I have strong 
epistemic reason for believing it is 
rose-colored until I realize someone 
has planted rose-colored glasses on 
my face. My initial reason is 
defeated, and I don’t know whether 
the flower is really rose-colored 
(even if luckily it is).  
 
Counterexamples to the Traditional Analysis 
Since justification seems to distinguish mere true belief from (heavyweight) knowledge, its addition 
completes the analysis—or so it seemed to many for 2400 years! It became Western heritage until 
Edmund Gettier (1927– ) in 1963 with his three-page article.12 
Gettier argued against the traditional analysis by counterexamples (examples that refute). His 
counterexamples are cases of JTB that aren’t knowledge. Since the original examples are intricate, we 
will consider more straightforward examples with the same gist. Such examples are called Gettier cases.  
You’re driving through sheep country. Passing a field, you seemingly see a sheep and think “There’s a 
sheep in the field.” Normally, this suffices for knowledge: you have a belief, a visual perception supports 
it, and there’s a sheep in the field. The kicker: you’re looking at a sheep-shaped rock, or a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing!13 There’s no way to tell from your angle. You have no reason to suspect. How is it true, then, 
that there’s a sheep in the field? Unbeknownst to you, there happens to be one out of sight, in some far-
off corner of the field. Intuitively, you don’t know there’s a sheep.  
You may not initially share this intuition (I didn’t at first). Sometimes intuitions need to be massaged or 
pumped before they surface. Here’s an intuition pump. Consider a revised scenario: the real sheep is 
removed. Since it was out of sight, you won’t be able to detect any change. So, for all you know nothing 
has changed. This means your state of knowledge should be the same as before. But in the revised 
scenario, it’s clear you don’t know. Since your state of knowledge is untouched by the revision, you 
didn’t know in the first place. A sheep of which you know not can’t help you know there’s a sheep. 
Thinkers had discovered this problem before Gettier made it famous, including the 14th-century Italian 
logician Peter of Mantua (Boh 1985). As early as the 8th century CE, the Indian philosopher Dharmottara 
devised a case: a desert traveler seeing a water mirage where there is real water underneath a rock has 
a justified true belief without knowledge (Dreyfus 1997). Spanning time and culture, such intuitions are 
widely and independently attested. 
Box 1 – The Lottery Problem 
 
 
Revised Analyses 
Gettier prompted the search for a fourth condition. On this view, knowledge is JTB plus some condition 
to rule out problematic cases—JTB+ accounts. There’s insufficient space to review these proposals here. 
Suffice it to say that the extra condition remains elusive. Perhaps the problem is that JTB+ carves up 
knowledge such that the + fails to match any natural concept. Cut out all the best-decorated pieces from 
a birthday cake, those portions may be nice. But the remainder has no identifiable shape.  
Returning to Plato’s footsteps, it may be more promising to seek what distinguishes true belief from 
knowledge—a TB+ account. Warrant is that which when added (in sufficient degree) to true belief yields 
knowledge (Plantinga 1992). Knowledge is (sufficiently) warranted true belief (sWTB). Now our question 
shifts: What is warrant?  
This shift has potential advantages. First, while sWTB is compatible with JTB+ accounts, it is also 
compatible with abandoning the justification condition, as some prefer.14 So, sWTB may bypass this 
debate. Second, there’s a kind of unity to warrant that justification lacks. Gettier cases are ones in which 
good luck cancels bad (Zagzebski 1994). In the sheep case, you’re unluckily misled by a sheep shape 
hither, but luckily made right by a real sheep thither. By contrast, lottery cases seem better construed as 
involving a single element of chance. Luck in Gettier and lottery cases doesn’t threaten justification. So, 
plausibly, the luck involved in acquiring truth via unjustified belief (e.g., pure guesswork) is a further 
kind. 
Matters aren’t so simple. There are also kinds of luck that contribute to knowledge. Suppose one luckily 
wins that tantalizing logic textbook in a raffle, reads it, and acquires knowledge. This knowledge is 
founded on good luck. So, let epistemic luck be the problematic kind: luck which prevents true belief 
from being knowledge. One alluring aspect of warrant is that it would rule out all and only epistemic 
luck.  
Lottery cases present a further challenge to the JTB analysis (Hawthorne 2003). Suppose you have a ticket in 
the state lottery. You haven’t checked whether it has won. But you reason that it’s a losing ticket, given that it’s 
only one of many millions. And you’re right: you lost. You have a justified true belief, but as the New York State 
lottery motto says, “Hey, you never know.” Assuming the motto is apt, one might explain lack of knowledge via 
the JTB analysis by denying justification for the belief that you lost. Perhaps what’s justified is the belief that 
you probably lost. Unfortunately, this subtle move doesn’t solve the problem so much as shift it to justification. 
Either way, what’s troubling here is that all beliefs seem based on some uncertainty (assuming fallibilism). Even 
after you check the numbers, you could have misread them, they could have been misreported, or you are 
dreaming. The lottery problem thus potentially threatens that we literally “never know”—anything. One escape 
route is to maintain that we do know in lottery cases. After all, it can seem just as intuitive to talk that way. 
Many people never bother with lottery tickets. When explaining why, it can seem natural to say something like 
“There’s never a real chance of winning those things. To be realistic, I know I’d lose.” It might not be nice to tell 
someone, “You do know you’re going to lose, right?” But if you flouted conversational etiquette, a receptive 
response is reasonable: “Yeah, you’re right, I know (sigh). But one can still hope.” So, it’s somewhat less clear 
that there’s a lottery problem for JTB. At any rate, it isn’t our main focus.  
But what connection between belief and truth accomplishes this? We don’t have space to explore them 
all. I’ll mention one promising direction as an example, which draws the parallel to action. Imagine an 
expert archer, Artemis. Her aim is perfect. The arrow is going to hit the bullseye—until the last moment 
when an earthquake shifts the target. A simultaneous gust of wind alters the arrow’s path, correcting 
course. In this scenario, skill is not the reason for success. When success is attributable to skill, it is to 
Artemis’s credit rather than by luck. Similarly, perhaps knowledge is “credit for true belief” (Greco 
2003). Knowledge is achieved when intellectual skill/excellence/virtue manifests in success (truth). So, 
knowledge is virtuously achieved true belief (Sosa 1980). From this originates virtue epistemology.   
Conclusion: Post-Gettier Epistemology 
Fast-forward several decades. Thousands of pages of ink have been spilled in the effort to identify the 
fourth condition, warrant, epistemic luck, the knowledge-yielding virtues, etc. Some believe they have 
the solution. Others continue to pursue new solutions. Perhaps you will be the one to find it! For now, 
there’s no agreed-upon answer. We live in a post-Gettier age: the problem no longer occupies center 
stage. Still, it inspired what came next.  
In the aftermath, some epistemologists came to suspect that knowledge is not subject to analysis—that 
no component can be added to (J)TB to get knowledge (Zagzebski 1994). If true, this doesn’t render 
knowledge mysterious. Some concepts are basic, and perhaps knowledge is one of them. Yes, 
knowledge may entail JTB, but this does not mean it can be divvied into neat chunks that seamlessly 
reassemble without remainder. This gave birth to knowledge-first epistemology (Williamson 2000).  
Others abandoned concern with knowledge altogether. What Gettier (and lottery) reveal, they say, is 
that knowledge is a concept with quirks. Who cares whether one is Gettiered (or “lotteried”)? What 
matters is acquiring the truth, having good reasons, or achieving intellectual virtue more generally (e.g., 
understanding, open-mindedness, curiosity, humility).15 Thus, virtue epistemologists began investigating 
the intellectual virtues themselves (Zagzebski 1996). 
Whatever tack one takes, there is one remarkable thing on which we can agree: Gettier’s little paper 
permanently transformed the world of epistemology. It planted seeds in an ever-growing garden of 
fruitful new directions, producing some of the most fascinating work the field has seen: work on 
epistemic luck, epistemic value, intellectual virtue, and more. Thus, conceptual analysis, even when 
unsuccessful, reveals insight. Much of what follows in this book we owe in large part to that.  
Questions for Reflection 
 
1. Practice the idea of analysis. Choose a concept that seems relatively easy to break into a short list of 
components (e.g., a mathematical object). First, produce a simplistic analysis. Second, offer a 
counterexample. Third, revise the analysis to avoid the counterexample. Repeat the process until 
you are satisfied with the result.  
 
2. Return to Figure 1. Notice that there are eight distinct bounded regions in the Venn diagram 
(including the space outside all three circles, which represents unjustified false non-beliefs). State 
one proposition that you can confidently place in each region.  
 
3. In Philosophy 101, students are often reluctant to formulate their own philosophical views. One oft-
cited reason is that the arguments for a given view, though strong, are not “definitive.” They don’t 
“prove” the conclusion with “100% certainty.” Given what was said about justification in this 
chapter, what epistemological mistake(s) might this exhibit? 
 
4. Consider the following speech excerpt from former U.S. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld (during 
a 2002 press conference about weapons of mass destruction and the War in Iraq): 
 
As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there 
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there 
are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know. (Graham 2014) 
 
Write a few paragraphs analyzing Rumsfeld’s claims about knowledge. What do they mean (setting 
aside political context)? Do you agree? Try to use examples and the JTB analysis (as an 
approximation to knowledge) to justify your view. 
 
5. Construct your own Gettier case. Hint: Use Zagzebski’s recipe: (a) start with something you think you 
know but could possibly be wrong about; (b) add an element of bad luck to make your belief turn 
out false after all; then (c) add a second element of good luck to cancel out the bad luck, making it 
true after all. 
 
6. The Gettier Game: Whenever you or someone you know has good reason to believe something but 
finds out later that something weird happened that made it turn out to be true by some sheer act of 
dumb luck, record it on a sheet of paper. Do this until you’ve found several Gettier cases. Then 
reflect on the rate. How common do such cases occur in real life? Given the frequency, do you think 
JTB is at least a good working approximation for knowledge?  
 
(Note: In graduate school at the University of Rochester, my fellow grad students and I played 
something like this game. We kept a running tally in our department lounge of days since one of us 
had been Gettiered. As soon as it happened, we’d reset the tally to zero. It never got very high.) 
 
7. What is the value of analyzing concepts? Would an analysis of knowledge (whether partial or 
complete) be useful for answering other epistemological questions? Can failed attempts to provide 
an analysis nevertheless provide some illumination? Keep these questions in mind as you read 
further chapters in this volume. 
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Glossary 
 
Ability knowledge: knowledge-how 
Acquaintance knowledge: knowing a person, place, or thing 
Belief-that: acceptance of a proposition’s truth  
Conceptual analysis: the breaking down of a concept into more basic conceptual components, arranged 
to form a definition 
Correspondence Theory: the view that a proposition is true when it corresponds to reality and false 
otherwise 
Counterexample: an example that refutes a claim or argument 
Defeater: that which cancels justification (a justification-defeater) or knowledge (a knowledge-defeater) 
Disbelief: belief that the corresponding proposition is false 
Doxastic attitude: a stance on the truth value of a proposition (belief, disbelief, or suspension of 
judgment) 
Epistemic justification: the kind of justification necessary for knowledge, requiring good epistemic 
reasons 
Epistemic luck: the kind of luck that prevents a true belief from being knowledge 
Epistemic reason: a truth-indicative reason—the kind necessary for epistemic justification 
Factive: that which entails the truth of its propositional object 
Fallibilism: the view that justification does not entail truth (fallibilism about justification) or that 
knowledge-level justification does not entail truth (fallibilism about knowledge)  
Gettier case: a case of the sort introduced by Gettier (when an element of bad epistemic luck is 
canceled by good epistemic luck, so that it is a justified true belief but not knowledge)  
Gettier problem: the problem of how to handle Gettier cases in the analysis of knowledge 
Heavyweight knowledge: the kind of knowledge that requires more than mere correct opinion 
Intellectual virtue: a good intellectual character trait, such as open-mindedness, intellectual humility, 
intellectual honesty, curiosity, or understanding 
Intuition pump: a device that helps bring out or strengthen an intuition 
JTB Analysis or the Traditional Analysis: the view that knowledge is justified true belief—a modern 
interpretation of Plato’s view 
JTB+ account: the view that knowledge is justified true belief plus some fourth condition to rule out 
Gettier cases (and perhaps lottery cases) 
Justification: good reasons for belief 
Knowledge-first epistemology: the view that knowledge is conceptually basic (and hence the starting 
point for epistemological theorizing), usually in conjunction with the claim that knowledge is of primary 
epistemic value (rather than, say, justification) 
Lightweight knowledge: true belief 
Loose talk: speech that is not strictly true (e.g., figurative, hyperbolic, approximate, or elliptical speech) 
Lottery case: a case in which a justified belief is true on probabilistic grounds (often thought to be a 
counterexample to the JTB analysis) 
Lottery problem: the problem of how to handle lottery cases in the theory of knowledge 
Phenomenal knowledge: knowledge of what it’s like to have a given experience 
Pragmatic justification: the kind of justification provided by good pragmatic reasons  
Pragmatic reason: a practical benefit of a belief or action 
Proper-basing condition: the requirement that a belief be formed or held in the right way for the right 
reasons 
Proposition: a statement or claim—something which has a truth value (true or false) 
Propositional knowledge: knowledge-that (where the that-clause expresses a proposition) 
Suspension (withholding) of judgment: remaining neutral about whether or not a proposition is true, 
neither believing nor disbelieving the proposition 
Truth value: true or false 
Virtue epistemology: the study of intellectual virtue 
Warrant: that which when added (in sufficient degree) to true belief yields knowledge 
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Notes 
 
1 See Sangeetha, Chapter 3 of this volume, for more on concepts and their relationship to truth and knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
2 The view expressed here (that experiential knowledge does not reduce to some amount of propositional 
knowledge) has become standard, beginning with Ryle (1949) on ability knowledge and Nagel (1974) on 
phenomenal knowledge.  
 
3 Zen emphasizes non-conceptual, non-dualistic awareness. Daoism emphasizes wuwei (action that flows freely 
and spontaneous from one’s nature without interruption by propositional deliberation). Confucianism emphasizes 
learning-how over (or in addition to) learning-that, as well as ritual participation to achieve ethical cultivation 
(training one’s emotions and habits of action) rather than propositional argumentation about ethical truths. 
 
4 The “that” is sometimes omitted from the that-clause in statements about propositional knowledge, but such 
sentences can always be accurately rephrased with the “that” included: “Readers know this chapter is about 
knowledge” means “Readers know that this chapter is about knowledge.” 
 
5 I have omitted knowledge-wh: knowledge -who, -what, -where, -when, -why, -which, -whether, and -how. Some 
subtypes of knowledge-wh are identical to those I already cover (e.g., knowledge-how). The others arguably 
reduce to the kinds I cover. For example, to know-why is to know-that, where the that-clause expresses a correct 
answer to the why-question. I have also omitted self-knowledge. The Oracle at Delphi directed one to “Know 
thyself.” Clearly, this is more than acquaintance with oneself. It is arguable whether it consists merely in knowing 
certain truths about oneself, or requires some special self-illuminating experience. Finally, there is no discussion in 
this chapter about “group knowledge” (e.g., what the scientific community knows)—a recent and controversial 
topic in social epistemology. Traditional epistemology focuses on an individual’s knowledge.  
 
6This is belief-that, which takes propositions as objects. I set aside belief-in, which can have non-propositional 
objects (e.g., “I believe in you.”). Belief-in isn’t purely cognitive. It has an affective component (e.g., hope or trust). 
This is an important distinction in religious epistemology, since many religious believers emphasize the kind of faith 
that requires belief-in rather than mere belief-that.     
 
7 However, it may be that the kind of belief required for knowledge is restricted to a specific degree of confidence. 
For example, if one is barely inclined to think a proposition is true, perhaps one doesn’t really know it’s true. 
Alternatively, perhaps one does know—just not for sure. This approach would have knowing for sure as only one 
type of knowing more generally. Aside from matters of degree, a further unclarity pertaining to belief arises when 
we aren’t thinking about a proposition (e.g., Do you know that 2+2 = 4 while sleeping?). One may say that we hold 
unconscious (stored) beliefs. Another possibility is that we have mere dispositions to believe, which get activated 
into beliefs when the propositions come to mind. This is a contentious issue. But whatever one thinks of it, one can 
plausibly say the same thing about justification and knowledge (unconscious justification/knowledge vs. a 
disposition to have justification/knowledge when prompted). So, there shouldn’t be a problem here for the 
analysis of knowledge per se.  
 
8 Cf. Radford (1966), who challenges the belief requirement. 
 
9 For an overview of the various theories of truth, and their pros and cons, see Glanzberg (2018).   
 
10 Cf. Hazlett (2010), who challenges the truth requirement on knowledge.  
 
11 Global skeptics will embrace this conclusion, but very few are attracted to such a strong form of skepticism.  See  
Massey, Chapter 4, for an overview of skepticism.  
 
12 Plantinga (1992) gives an alternative historical perspective on Gettier’s significance: that it is mere contemporary 
“lore.” 
 
13 I borrow Earl Conee’s humorous adaptation (in p.c.) of Chisholm’s (1966) famous example.  
 
 
14 The justification condition was abandoned primarily by those who use the term in a certain way. There are those 
who inflate it (as earlier described). A fine line away, there are those who inflate the concept of “good reasons” to 
something unnecessary for knowledge (usually externalists who understand reasons as exclusively internalist—see 
Long, Chapter 2). Still others came to use “justification” so that it is by definition a requirement on knowledge: 
whatever it is that distinguishes true belief from knowledge (rendering it equivalent to warrant). However, there is 
at least one way of using these terms that neither inflates nor trivializes. And this is the most common usage, 
which I adopt in this chapter.   
 
15 Others prefer to bite the bullet, dig in their heels, and revert to pre-Gettier tradition. Gettier and lottery, they 
say, have led us astray. Yes, intuitions favor them. But sometimes intuitions are wrong. By utilizing standard 
explanatory criteria for evaluating theories (e.g., overall theoretical simplicity, coherence, and other explanatory 
virtues), Weatherson (2003) argues that the JTB analysis is the best theory of knowledge and dismisses intuitive 
counterexamples as weird conceptual hiccups. 
